Friday, February 14, 2014

New Mexico Supreme Court Case On Residential Mortgage Foreclosure


“When in doubt, duck”  (Malcolm Forbes 1919-1990)

On February 13, 2014 the New Mexico Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion on residential mortgage foreclosures, Bank of New York v. Joseph A. Romero and Mary Romero, Docket No. 33224.   The Romeros appealed from a judgment of foreclosure entered against them in Santa Fe District Court.  The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.  The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and instructed the district court  to vacate its foreclosure judgment. 

With one exception, noted at the end of the Blog, it is possible that the Romero case will not be that important to most New Mexico banks. The following factors in the case which may make its precedential value less important:  (1) it is a refinance of a residential mortgage; (2) it involves a MERS transaction with sloppy record keeping and servicing procedures, compounded by poor presentation of evidence and (3) the refinance transaction took place in 2006 and statutory changes to the Home Loan Protection Act consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion have taken place (in addition to the new mortgage regulations of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).   Nonetheless, Justice Daniels, writing for the Court, engaged in interpretation of documents and evidence in a manner that may cause defense attorneys to construct defenses in both cases involving old mortgages and newer ones.  Also the Court’s ruling on preemption may be very important. 

The facts are simple.  A lender, Equity One, convinced the Romeros in a cold call to refinance their existing mortgage in 2006.  The new interest rate was higher than the existing mortgage—almost double.  The amount of the refinanced mortgage was almost $50,000 higher than the old one. No income data was gathered, except Mr. Romero’s claim that his business made $5,600 per month. The monthly payment increased by approximately $400.  In an effort to satisfy the HLPA’s  requirement that the refinanced loan conferred “a reasonable tangible net benefit” to them, Equity One had the Romeros sign a document that their receipt of $30,000 cash from the transaction was  “ a reasonable tangible net benefit” to them.   The Romeros defaulted.  In 2008 Bank of New York filed suit for foreclosure, claiming it was the holder of the Romeros’ Note with right of enforcement. The Romeros responded.   In effect, they argued, “Who is Bank of New York” and claimed that Bank of New York did not own the note and lacked standing to foreclose. 

The Supreme Court agreed.  Although the  principal holding on standing may not  affect many New Mexico banks it is an amusing example of how some servicers handle the foreclosure process when dealing with mortgage backed securities.  The MERS apparently did not assign the Note to Bank of New York until three months after the Romeros were sued.  The Note attached to the complaint showed an endorsement to J.P. Morgan Chase.  The servicer’s witness presented a Note without endorsements and claimed Bank of New York was holder.  When he tried to rehabilitate the Note status, defendants Romero objected that the testimony was hearsay since the servicer was not brought into the case until several months after the complaint was filed.  The trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed this objection.  However, Justice Daniels did not.  The Court agreed with the Romeros that the Bank of New York’s evidence about the Note was fatally flawed.  He held that Bank of New York had not proved its status as holder or its rights to enforce the Note and foreclose.  It lacked standing to foreclose.

But Justice Daniels went further.  Writing for the Court, he stated that HLPA requires that the borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage loan must be a factor in meeting HLPA’s requirement that the borrower receive a “reasonable, tangible net benefit”.  Justice Daniels dismissed the Romeros’ signing a document stating that their receipt of $30,000 was a “reasonable, tangible net benefit”.  He noted that the document prepared by Equity One was part of a mass of closing documents.  He noted that such form documents could not replace the lender’s ”conscientious compliance with the obligations imposed by HLPA”. Thus the Court held that in the absence of a showing that the lender looked at the borrower’s ability to repay there was a violation of HLPA.  It should be noted that the 2009 amendment to HLPA now requires lenders to make a good faith effort to determine a borrower’s ability to repay, and federal law and the recent CFPB’s regulations are similar. 

The Court also held, in what is arguably the most important holding for even current mortgage lending, that federal law does not preempt HLPA enforcement by the state.  It is also probable that the CFPB’s new regulations do not preempt HLPA since most experts feel that CFPB preemption would only occur if the state regulations or law were more lenient that the federal rule. Additionally, the Court held that Dodd-Frank made the preemption claim not valid.

Justice Daniels noted that the Financial Institutions Division had not updated its regulations since 2004.  In 2004 the Division concluded that an OCC directive prohibited the Division from enforcing HLPA against national banks.  However, Daniels reviewed U.S. Supreme Court preemption cases since 2004 and concluded that the Division’ s acceptance of federal preemption was outdated.  In addition, he reviewed the preemption standards for national banks set forth in Dodd-Frank, which significantly relaxed the preemption standards.  The OCC has now corrected its 2004 blanket preemption rule to meet Dodd-Frank.   And Justice Daniels compared Dodd-Frank’s preemption rule to HLPA and found no conflict.

Lawyers can always argue about what cases mean and their application to facts.  However, there is no question that the Romero is important.  For refinanced mortgages before 2009 the lender must prove that the borrower’s ability to repay was considered in a meaningful, good faith manner.  The holders of notes and mortgages that have been through the MERS process must put on evidence that meets the normal court rules on evidence.  Finally, those who are in the mortgage business must look closely at HLPA and not comply only with CFPB regulations but HLPA.  And HLPA has rights of action that CFPB may not have.

The bright spot is that Justice Daniel’s opinion goes far in blunting the contention that existing New Mexico law does not protect the borrower.  So why enact untried and possibly harmful legislation to meet the so-called “foreclosure crisis”?

Do good.
Marshall G. Martin
505 228 8506


Wednesday, February 12, 2014

Almost Over?



“Even if you are on the right track, you’ll get run over if you just sit there.”
Will Rogers (1879-1935)

The legislature will adjourn on February 20.  As of the date of this Blog it is not certain if the House, Senate and Governor can reach agreement on the budget in the remaining time left.  If not, there will be a special session.

A disturbing trend has surfaced as the Democrat majority in the Senate seeks to avoid Governor Martinez’ veto.  Using the Senate Joint Resolution route to propose a constitutional amendment, Senator Sanchez has proposed a maximum legal interest rate of 36% on loans other than bank loans. One Senator tried to get legalized marijuana as a constitutional amendment—that failed.  If the trend continues, the New Mexico Constitution will look like that of a third world country[1]· in which everything from parking violations to routine statutory provisions are dealt with.  Some legislators are concerned and are moving to require a  two-thirds vote in each chamber to propose constitutional amendments. 

We have been spared the mortgage foreclosure bills that crop up in the regular session with their mandatory mediation and extended default cure provisions.  Instead, two memorials (HM 15 and SM11) have been introduced under the banner of the United South Broadway Corporation, an activist community organization, to form a “task force” to study the foreclosure process and “restore” due process to those threatened with foreclosure.  The memorials with 15 detailed “Whereas” clauses setting forth the sins of the banks that have settled government claims of poor or unlawful practices, then calls for the task force to be convened to solve the problem.  The suggested participants are community organizations from around the state, the Independent Community Bankers Association or mortgage association, MFA, citizens suffering from foreclosure, clergy, retired judge, etc.  I know that the Independent Community Bankers Association has resisted    being dragooned into the task force.  I suspect the other business associations have similar concerns.  Although a House or Senate Memorial does not have the force of law, one can see the “task force” proposing sweeping changes to foreclosure proceedings as banks try to cope with the burden of new mortgage rules from the federal government.

The Data Breach Notification Act (HB 224), a product of the Attorney General’s consumer protection division, is winding its way through the legislature, having received a “do pass” from the House Consumer and Public Affairs Committee.  A substitute bill has removed much of the mischief of the bill for banks, since it appears to exempt banks subject to Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct.  It is poorly drafted and for major credit card issuers still has some dangers.  Most alarming, three sections of HB 224 apply to any “person” who has “personal identity information”, which is basically the information most businesses may collect in any credit or lease transaction.  The term “person” is not defined.  And under the proposed legislation, the “person” who has “personal identify information”, must institute safeguards, have security procedures and disposal policies with respect to the material.  Thus, by accident (I think) auto dealers, hospitals, medical providers, and any business that collects social security numbers, birth dates, addresses, etc. is subject to the “Act” and faces Attorney General investigation and litigation.

HB 249 affects all banks.  It amends the tax levy provisions of the taxation code to permit service of levies on banks by “electronic” means.  This is not a foreign concept since many banks now store electronic customer information and agreements electronically.  A document stored under the federal or New Mexico electronic authentication statutes is as valid as the original. Electronic documents are used in court. [2] So what is the effect of HB 224?  Simply put, instead of Sheriff or other authorized official physically serving your bank branch, it can be done in the same form by electronic means.  Failure to honor a levy may subject the bank to penalty.  The only concern is that the banks institute procedures to cope with this new method of service (if it survives the session).

Boring?  Sorry.  Do good.

Marshall G. Martin
(505)228 8506








[1] Please don’t respond, “Dummy we look like one!”
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[2] Caution:  Promissory Notes are usually not accepted in many courts in electronic form.